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1. Introduction
1   
The sharp slowdown in bank lending between 2008 and 2009 in the major developed 
countries, including Italy, raises important questions. To what extent was it the result of 
macroeconomic forces and their effects on credit demand by firms and households, or 
instead of a tightening of banks’ credit supply standards? If a significant supply restraint did 
occur, did it take place through price changes or through non-price rationing? And was it 
related mainly to credit risk developments or to changes in banks’ balance sheet conditions 
and to their difficulties in raising funds in the market?   
All of these questions are related to a more general issue that, though the object of a 
large body of research, remains far from settled, namely how to disentangle supply and 
demand effects on credit developments, given that the latter always reflect the combination 
of these two forces. This is a crucial issue for policymakers, as changes in credit dynamics – 
especially when they are exceptional, as in the period considered – can have different effects 
on economic activity and require different monetary policy responses depending on whether 
they originate from demand or supply shocks.
2 
However, disentangling the contribution of supply and demand factors using “hard 
data” on loans and other macro-variables is difficult. Changes in both prices and quantities 
reflect shifts in credit demand and supply curves, which in turn are potentially affected by 
business cycle fluctuations and changes in the monetary policy stance (see Bernanke and 
Gertler 1995, Kiyotaki and Moore 1997, and Bernanke et al. 1996, among others). 
This paper assesses the relative role of supply and demand factors in shaping credit 
developments in Italy, with a focus on the sharp slowdown of 2008-09. It also examines, for 
the entire sample period and specifically for the crisis period, the role of the various factors 
behind changes in credit standards, distinguishing between factors relating to the cost of 
                                                           
1 We thank Ugo Albertazzi, Paolo Angelini, Daniel Dichter, Eugenio Gaiotti, Hannah Sabine Hempell, 
Angela Maddaloni, Domenico Marchetti, Fabio Panetta, José-Luis Peydró, Carlotta Rossi, Federico Signoretti, 
Stefano Siviero, Eliana Viviano and other participants in seminars at the Bank of Italy and the European 
Central Bank for useful comments and discussions. The views expressed in this paper are ours alone and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy.  
2 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009) compare major post–World War II episodes in the developed world and 
find that the aftermath of banking crises is typically characterized by a sharp fall in output and employment and 
a dramatic increase in the real value of government debt. The analysis carried out by the IMF (2009) also 
suggests that recessions associated with financial crises have been  historically more severe and protracted than 
other recessions. Bassanetti et al. (2009) show that all of the most severe recessions in Italy since 1970 were 
associated with a sharp slowdown in credit to the private sector and a tightening of supply conditions.   6
funds and balance sheet constraints on the one hand and factors connected to borrowers’ 
creditworthiness and banks’ risk perception on the other.
3 
The analysis has been carried out by combining qualitative information from the 
Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey (BLS) – the quarterly survey on credit conditions carried 
out since the end of 2002 in all countries of the euro area– with micro-data on loan quantities 
and prices for the Italian banks participating in the survey.
4 We use each bank’s survey 
responses on loan supply and demand conditions (though with no disclosure of individual 
answers) together with data on its lending during the sample period to non-financial firms 
and to households for house purchases, and on the respective individual loan interest rates. 
This approach differentiates our paper from previous studies based on the BLS or other 
lending surveys, all of which use aggregate data both for survey information and for credit 
developments.
5 
For the euro area, de Bondt et al. (2010) carry out a country-panel analysis, showing 
that the BLS responses on supply standards and demand help explain the growth in bank 
loans to enterprises, as well as real GDP growth and non-residential investment growth. 
Hempell and Kok Sorensen (2009) use the same methodology and data to carry out an 
analysis that focuses on the crisis period and also examines the relative importance of the 
various factors behind supply restraints. Maddaloni, Peydró and Scopel (2009) focus on the 
effects of monetary policy on credit standards. Ciccarelli, Maddaloni and Peydró (2009) 
assess, inter alia, the effects on economic activity of credit supply and demand shocks as 
captured by the BLS indicators.  
For the United States, Lown, Morgan and Rohatgi (2000) and Lown and Morgan 
(2002, 2006), using macro-data from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey of Bank 
Lending Practices  (carried out by the Federal Reserve System since 1967), show that 
                                                           
3 Related evidence is provided by Panetta and Signoretti (2010), who present a broad discussion of the 
relative role of supply and demand factors in credit developments in Italy during the crisis, and Caivano, 
Rodano and Siviero (2010) and Gaiotti (2010), who estimate the impact of credit supply factors on firms’ 
investment decisions and economic growth in Italy, also focusing on the crisis period. 
4 The survey includes questions on lending standards, loan demand, specific terms and conditions in the 
provision of loans (such as price and non-price supply conditions), and factors driving loan supply and demand. 
The results are published regularly by the European Central Bank (ECB) for the euro area as a whole and by 
the Eurosystem national central banks for the respective countries. A detailed description of the survey can be 
found in Berg et al. (2005). 
5 To our knowledge, the only previous attempt to use individual banks’ data together with the BLS 
information is the study by Hempell (2004) on Germany. However, it considers a very short sample period 
(only eight quarters) which, as the author remarks, did not permit a sensible econometric analysis.  7
changes in credit supply standards help to predict loan growth and economic activity, and 
that a sharp tightening of credit standards has preceded virtually all economic recessions.   
As an alternative to the use of a cross-country panel, our approach also allows us to 
enlarge the number of observations and circumvent the limits deriving from the shortness of 
the BLS sample period. Moreover, it has another important advantage in that loan 
developments and survey responses relate to the same panel of banks, while all other studies 
consider, in various ways, the relationship between the survey responses of a panel of banks 
and credit developments for the entire banking system. Although national panels in the BLS 
or in other surveys are designed to be representative of the respective national systems, the 
correspondence is inevitably approximate, which can potentially affect the results. In the 
case of Italy, the panel of banks participating in the BLS is quite large, as it corresponds to 
more than 60 per cent of the total system in terms of outstanding loans to enterprises and to 
households for house purchases; however, it is mostly representative of large banks, and 
lending developments for these banks do not necessarily coincide with those for the entire 
Italian banking system. During the financial crisis, in particular, the slowdown in lending 
was sharper for these banks than for smaller banks. This suggests that we can obtain more 
reliable results by using lending data for the same panel of banks that participate in the BLS.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents descriptive 
evidence. Section 3 illustrates the main findings for both lending to enterprises and to 
households for house purchases. The subsequent three sections focus on lending to 
enterprises, in the light of their sharper deceleration during the financial crisis and their 
stronger estimated relationship with the BLS indicators. Specifically, Section 4 examines the 
relative importance of the different factors involved in the changes of credit standards. 
Section 5 conducts a counterfactual exercise to assess the relative importance of demand and 
supply determinants during the financial crisis, and of “pure supply” vs. “perception of risk” 
determinants. Section 6 presents a robustness check on the relationship between loan growth 
and BLS information and its possible interpretative implications. Section 7 concludes. 
2. BLS indicators and credit developments in Italy: data and descriptive evidence 
This section provides information on the data used in the paper and some descriptive 
statistics.  
The study is carried out on data for the panel of Italian banking groups (henceforth 
“banks”) participating in the BLS, which are among the largest in the country. The effects of  8
mergers, which over time had tended to reduce their number, has been offset by subsequent 
additions. As a result, the dataset consists of an unbalanced panel of 11 Italian banks 
involved in the survey (with a maximum of 8 banks per quarter, including the more recent 
period) over a sample period of 29 quarters (from the fourth quarter of 2002 to the fourth 
quarter of 2009), providing a total of 207 observations. For both loans to enterprises and 
mortgage loans to households, the outstanding amounts granted by the banks participating in 
the survey corresponded at the time of the study (end of 2009) to around 60 per cent of the 
total provided by the whole Italian banking system.  
 
Figure 1. Loans to enterprises: Italian banks in the BLS panel and total banking system 































































































































BLS panel of banks
 
 
Figure 2. Mortgage loans to households: Italian banks in the BLS panel and total banking system 
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Figures 1 and 2, which report the growth rates of bank loans to enterprises and 
households for both the panel of banks and the overall Italian system, show that the pattern 
of credit dynamics for the banks in the BLS panel is similar to that for the system as a whole, 
although the rate of growth is lower over most of the sample period, especially in the case of 
enterprises and during the financial crisis. 
As to the information provided by the Italian component of the BLS, Table 1 gives 
descriptive statistics for the indicators of supply and demand conditions for, respectively, 
loans to enterprises and mortgage loans to households.
6 They are reported for the whole 
period considered and separately for the pre-crisis period (2002Q4–2007Q2) and the crisis 
period (2007Q3–2009Q4), and, within the latter, also for the post-Lehman period (2008Q3–
2009Q4). The table reports the frequency of individual banks’ answers concerning supply 
conditions and their assessments of demand developments; all answers refer to the changes 
in the previous three months. 
In the case of loans to enterprises, considering the entire period, a large majority of 
individual banks’ responses fall in the “unchanged” category. Answers reporting that supply 
conditions had eased (either considerably or somewhat) are almost absent. Many responses 
indicate “tightened somewhat”, while very few indicate “tightened considerably”. Notable 
differences emerge when we split the sample period: during the crisis 40 per cent of the 
answers fall in the “tightened” category, compared with less than one fourth in the pre-crisis 
period. As to the demand assessments, no extreme answers were observed; the frequency of 
responses indicating a “decrease” doubled in the crisis period with respect to the previous 
one. 
Considering mortgage loans to households, over the entire sample period a large 
majority of answers on supply conditions indicate “unchanged”, while extreme answers are 
absent. The percentage of answers reporting a “tightening” rises considerably when we move 
from the pre-crisis to the crisis period (from 7 per cent to 34 per cent). Almost 40 per cent of 
the answers indicate a decrease in demand during the crisis, compared with a very low 
percentage in the pre-crisis period.    
 
                                                           
6 The survey also has sections that were not used in this study. They include questions on consumer credit 
and other lending to households and forward-looking questions regarding banks’ expectations of the evolution 
of credit standards and demand conditions over the next three months. The complete questionnaire can be 
found on the ECB and the Bank of Italy websites.  10
Table 1 – BLS responses on supply and demand conditions: descriptive statistics 
(frequency of responses and, in brackets, percentages with respect to total in each period)  
 
a) loans to enterprises 
1="eased 
considerably"
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
1="decreased 
considerably"
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
2="eased 
somewhat"
3 (1.4) 2 (1.5) 1 (1.3) 1 (2.1)
2="decreased 
somewhat"
28 (13.5) 12 (9.2) 16 (21.1) 15 (31.3)
3="basically 
unchanged"
150 (72.5) 105 (80.2) 45 (59.2) 26 (54.2)
3="basically 
unchanged "
136 (65.7) 88 (67.2) 48 (63.2) 26 (54.2)
4="tightened 
somewhat"
51 (24.6) 21 (16.0) 30 (39.5) 21 (43.8)
4="increased 
somewhat"
43 (20.8) 31 (23.7) 12 (15.8) 7 (14.6)
5="tightened 
considerably"
3 (1.4) 3 (2.3) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
5="increased 
considerably"
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Total observations 207 (100.0) 131 (100.0) 76 (100.0) 48 (100.0) Total observations 207 (100.0) 131 (100.0) 76 (100.0) 48 (100.0)
02Q4-07Q2
















b) mortgage loans to households 
1="eased 
considerably"
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
1="decreased 
considerably"
4 (1.9) 0 (0.0) 4 (5.3) 2 (4.2)
2="eased 
somewhat"
21 (10.1) 18 (13.7) 3 (3.9) 1 (2.1)
2="decreased 
somewhat"
31 (15.0) 6 (4.6) 25 (32.9) 18 (37.5)
3="basically 
unchanged"
151 (72.9) 104 (79.4) 47 (61.8) 30 (62.5)
3="basically 
unchanged "
107 (51.7) 70 (53.4) 37 (48.7) 19 (39.6)
4="tightened 
somewhat"
35 (16.9) 9 (6.9) 26 (34.2) 17 (35.4)
4="increased 
somewhat"
60 (29.0) 50 (38.2) 10 (13.2) 9 (18.8)
5="tightened 
considerably"
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
5="increased 
considerably"
5 (2.4) 5 (3.8) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)















In the BLS, banks are also asked to respond to more detailed questions concerning the 
factors that affected their decisions on credit standards and the specific terms and conditions 
for approving loans, and their assessment of the determinants of the demand for loans. 
Concerning the factors behind changes in credit standards, banks are asked to rate the 
importance of the cost of funds and balance sheet constraints, pressure from competition, 
and perception of risk, choosing their answers on a scale of five options (from “contributed 
considerably to tightening of credit standards” to “contributed considerably to easing of 
credit standards”).
7 Terms and conditions concern prices, quantities and other non-price 
                                                           
7 For loans to enterprises, banks’ cost of funds and balance sheet constraints are further differentiated into 
cost related to the bank’s capital position, bank’s ability to access market financing, and bank’s liquidity 
position; pressure from competition may be related to other banks, to non-banks, or to market financing; 
perception of risk may concern expectations regarding general economic activity, industry or firm-specific 
outlook, or risk on collateral demanded. For mortgage loans to households, the question refers to cost of funds 
  11
conditions. Responses can be chosen among the same five options available for the general 
question (i.e. from “tightened considerably” to “eased considerably”).
8  
Detailed descriptive evidence on the answers to these specific questions is reported in 
the Appendix (Tables A1-A6). The main facts, in particular concerning the crisis period, can 
be summarized as follows. 
For loans to enterprises: 
i) Both in the pre-crisis and in the crisis period the most important factors determining 
the tightening of credit standards were the perception of credit risk (Table A1). The 
importance of factors relating to the bank’s balance sheet position and ability to access 
finance rose during the crisis but remained less important than risk considerations. 
ii) The tightening of supply conditions during the crisis took place through changes in 
both margins and credit availability (Table A2). The frequency of responses of “tightened 
somewhat” for both margins on average loans and margins on riskier loans rose 
considerably. The percentage of answers indicating a reduction in the size of loans or credit 
lines remained lower by comparison but showed a sharp increase.  
iii) According to the banks’ assessments the weakness of demand during the crisis 
period was mainly attributable to less need to finance fixed investment and to a lower 
requirement for mergers and acquisitions and corporate restructuring (Table A3). 
For mortgage loans to households: 
iv) Perceptions of risk were the leading factor in the tightening; a smaller role was 
played by the cost of funds and balance sheet constraints (Table A4).  
v) The tightening of credit standards during the crisis period occurred mainly through 
increases in margins on riskier loans and reductions in the loan-to-value ratio (Table A5). 
vi) Housing market prospects, which had contributed to higher demand during the pre-
crisis period, provided a negative contribution during the crisis (Table A6). 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
and balance sheet constraints with no further specification, pressure from competition from other banks and 
from non-banks, and perception of risk relating to the general economic outlook or housing market prospects. 
8 More precisely, price conditions refer to the interest rate margins on, respectively, average loans and 
riskier loans; quantity conditions to the size of the loan or credit line; other non-price conditions to non-interest 
rate charges, collateral requirements, loan covenants and maturity for loans to enterprises and to collateral 
requirements, loan-to-value ratio, maturity and non-interest rate charges for mortgage loans to households.  12
Figures 3 and 4 provide descriptive evidence on the relationship between the evolution 
of the BLS indicators of supply and demand conditions in Italy and the growth in loans to 
enterprises and mortgage loans to households (which will be the object of the econometric 
investigation presented in the following sections). The sharp slowdown in lending to 
enterprises during the financial crisis went along with a fall in the BLS demand indicator and 
a tightening of supply conditions, the latter being particularly strong in the last two quarters 
of 2008, the most acute phase of the crisis. The slowdown in mortgage loans to households, 
which began in 2006 and then continued at a broadly constant pace, was accompanied by a 
decline in the BLS demand indicator until 2008Q3 and by a tightening of credit standards 
from the second half of 2007 onwards.  










































































































































Loans to enterprises, annualized quarter-on-quarter growth rate (seasonally adjusted), left-hand scale
BLS indicator of supply conditions ("net percentages")
BLS indicator of demand conditions ("net percentages")  
 










































































































































Mortgage loans to households, annualized quarter-on-quarter growth rate (seasonally adjusted), left-hand scale
BLS indicator of supply conditions ("net percentages")
BLS indicator of demand conditions ("net percentages")  
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A general caveat, which applies to our study, as to any other analysis based on a 
survey, is that the quality of the results depends on the veracity of the respondents’ answers. 
In the case of lending surveys, it is typically thought that banks may be inclined to report 
tighter credit standards than the ones they actually apply. This hypothesis originates from the 
empirical observation that in the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey  indications of   
“tightening” have historically outnumbered those of “easing”; it also reflects the 
consideration that banks, as regulated institutions, may have an incentive to report tighter 
policies than those actually implemented if they fear that the information could be exploited 
for supervisory purposes, especially when the survey is conducted by the supervisory 
authority (Schreft and Owens 1991). By contrast, in a crisis period such as the recent one, 
banks can be exposed to public criticism and political pressure, being regarded as 
responsible for a credit crunch that hurts the economy, and thus might have an incentive to 
portray their policies as less restrictive than they actually are, even though the results of the 
survey are only published as aggregate data for the entire panel, with no disclosure of 
individual answers. This issue is explored further in Section 4. 
3. Information content of BLS indicators: empirical evidence 
The econometric analysis on the information content of BLS indicators is carried out 
on an unbalanced panel of 11 Italian banks and a sample period of 29 quarters (2002Q4-
2009Q4), by estimating regressions of the following general form: 
 
(1)                            it t it it i it X D BLS L S BLS L Loans            _ ) ( _ ) ( , 
where  it Loans   is the quarter-on-quarter (henceforth q-o-q) rate of growth in bank lending 
for bank i in the quarter t, alternatively for loans to enterprises and for mortgage loans to 
households;
9 BLS_Si and BLS_Di indicate, respectively, the indicators of supply and demand 
                                                           
9 The data on loans are adjusted for the effects of securitization; this adjustment improves the economic 
significance of the dependent variable and is particularly important in the case of mortgage loans to households 
(due to the high proportion of securitized loans) and especially for the crisis period, due to the large amount of 
securitized loans, used as collateral in euro-area banks’ refinancing operations with the Eurosystem. Seasonal 
patterns were taken into account by including a set of appropriate seasonal dummies in the estimated equation. 
This approach has been preferred to the use of more sophisticated routines owing to the relatively short time 
series available for some intermediaries included in the panel.   14
conditions obtained from the BLS for bank i;
10 X is a vector of other variables that can 
influence loan growth, including the interest rate on individual bank loans, the monetary 
policy rate and other macro variables usually included in estimated credit demand equations 
(nominal GDP, gross fixed capital formation and financing need in the case of loans to firms, 
house prices for mortgage loans to households; see respectively Casolaro et al. (2006) and 
Casolaro and Gambacorta (2005)). Fixed bank effects and (when appropriate) time dummies 
were also included in the estimated equations.  
Since the BLS indicators are qualitative variables, BLS_Si and BLS_Di
 are defined as 
two vectors of dummy variables, each of which corresponds to one of the possible 
alternative answers in the survey. The relationship between credit growth and the BLS 
indicators can thus be written as follows:  
(2)            
it t it 4 it 3
it 2 it 1
it 4 it 3
it 2 it 1 i it
ε γX incrcons (L)BLS_D λ incrsome (L)BLS_D λ
decrsome (L)BLS_D λ decrcons (L)BLS_D λ
tightcons (L)BLS_S β tightsome (L)BLS_S β




   
_ _                 
_ _                  
_ _                   
_ _
 
The dummies for credit supply conditions correspond to the following responses: 
1=“eased considerably”; 2=“eased somewhat”; 3=“tightened somewhat”; 4=“tightened 
considerably”. Those for credit demand conditions correspond to the following assessments: 
1=“decreased considerably”; 2=“decreased somewhat”; 3=“increased somewhat”; 
4=“increased considerably”. For instance, BLS_S_tightsomeit is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if at time t bank i reported that its credit standards had “tightened 
somewhat” in the previous three months and zero otherwise.  
The expected sign is negative for  2 1 4 3 , , ,     and positive for 4 3 2 1 , , ,     ; the effects 
are expected to be larger for the banks’ responses falling in the extreme modalities (when 
replies of this kind are actually observed, which is not always the case), i.e. we would expect 
that | | | | 2 1    ,  | | | | 3 4    ,  | | | | 2 1     and  | | | | 3 4    . It is important to notice that the supply 
and demand effects estimated on the basis of these variables provide an indication of effects 
which are captured by the BLS indicators, over and above those captured by the other 
variables included in the regression. This holds in particular for the indicator of demand 
conditions, since credit demand may be related to common macroeconomic developments 
whose influence should be captured by the level of interest rates, other macro-variables and 
                                                           
10 Both the supply and the demand indicators may enter with the contemporaneous or lagged value. The lag 
order was chosen, trying a range between 0 and 4, on the basis of the fit of the regression.   15
the time dummies included in the regression. However, the evidence reported below 
indicates that the introduction of control variables does not significantly affect the estimation 
results for the BLS variables.
11  
It is worth noting that an alternative could be to include the cumulated levels of the 
BLS indicators, rather than the indicators themselves. As remarked in the methodological 
discussion in Section 6, this definition would indeed be more consistent with a literal reading 
of the BLS questions and answers, an important aspect that has not been addressed in 
previous work based on lending surveys, including recent studies on the BLS information for 
the euro area. However, as we show in the same section, the inclusion of the cumulated 
indicators provides unclear results or worsens the fit of the estimates (depending on the 
approach), which argues against following this alternative specification. 
The results are reported in Table 2 for loans to enterprises and in Table 3 for mortgage 
loans to households. Column (a) refers to the specification that only includes the BLS 
indicators as regressors (i.e.  0   ), column (b) to the regression that also includes the 
individual bank loan rate and macroeconomic variables
12 and column (c) to the regression 
that includes time dummies and excludes all macro variables. Columns (d) and (e) replicate 
the specifications of columns (a) and (b) but allow for possible changes in the relationship in 
the crisis period. This was done by including terms of interaction between the BLS supply or 
demand indicators and a crisis dummy variable (which takes value 1 for all quarters in the 
crisis period). As breakpoints, we considered alternatively the beginning of the financial 
crisis, in 2007q3, and the beginning of the most acute phase of the crisis, with the Lehman 
collapse, in 2008q3. For the first of these, none of the estimated coefficients of the 
interaction terms proved to be statistically significant for both categories of loans. Therefore 
the tables report only the additional effects for the post-Lehman period. Finally, individual 
bank fixed effects and seasonal dummies were included in all specifications.
13 
                                                           
11 We also controlled for the possibility that loan dynamics have been significantly affected by local 
demand developments, not necessarily captured by the national variables. We computed Herfinhdal indices of 
regional concentration for the lending activity of the banks belonging to the panel in the 20 Italian regions. 
Since they indicated the presence of a significant degree of regional concentration for some banks, we 
estimated regressions including interaction terms between individual bank dummies and regional demand 
indicators (using industrial firms’ assessments on the development of, alternatively, orders and production, both 
taken from the monthly business survey carried out by the Institute for Studies and Economic Analysis - ISAE).    
The results obtained indicated no significant change in coefficients of the BLS supply and demand indicators. 
12 Specifications where the individual loan rate was replaced by the Eonia (as a variable representative of 
the monetary policy interest rate) or by the spread between these two rates were also estimated, with no 
significant change in the results. 
13 Excluding the individual bank fixed effects did not provide any significant change in the results.  16
Results for loans to enterprises 
In the case of loans to enterprises, based on the regression which only includes the 
BLS indicators (Table 2, column a), both supply and demand conditions appear to have a 
statistically significant role. The results indicate that responses of a “tightened considerably” 
by all banks in the panel would be associated (with a one quarter lag) with a reduction in the 
q-o-q rate of growth of loans by 2.3 percentage points (corresponding to about 9 percentage 
points on an annual basis) with respect to the growth rate that would have been observed in 
the same quarter had all banks left their credit standards unchanged. The effect of a 
“tightened somewhat” change in credit standards is also highly significant and only slightly 
smaller in magnitude. The coefficient for the “eased somewhat” dummy (no “eased 
considerably” response was ever recorded) is not significant. As to demand conditions, both 
indications of “increased somewhat” and “decreased somewhat” for demand are significantly 
related to credit dynamics, as they are associated with, respectively, an increase in the 
(contemporaneous) q-o-q growth rate of loans of about 1.4 percentage points and a decrease 
in the same rate of growth of 0.9 percentage points.
14  
Column (b) shows that the coefficient of the individual bank loan rate is positive and 
significant. This result is in line with those obtained in other studies considering a monetary 
policy interest rate, including papers that also analyze the information content of bank 
lending surveys (Lown and Morgan 2006 for the US and de Bondt et al. 2010 for the euro 
area).
15  The estimated effects of all BLS variables decrease somewhat, but the changes are 
larger for the BLS demand indicator; in particular, the effect of “decreased somewhat” 
demand becomes non significant. Column (c) shows that even including time dummies the 
information content of the BLS variables remains appreciable, especially concerning supply 
conditions (with the “tightened somewhat” dummy still playing a significant role). 
The results reported in columns (d) and (e) indicate that there are no significant 
changes in the estimated relationship during the crisis period. Although this suggests that 
there was no break in the relationship between BLS indicators and credit growth in the crisis 
                                                           
14 Although the results are not perfectly comparable with those of de Bondt et al. (2010) for the euro area 
(in their case supply and demand conditions are collapsed in just two variables, corresponding to the respective 
net percentages), the magnitude of the estimated effects is of a similar order. For supply, the speed of 
transmission appears to be quicker (in the case of the area the maximum effect is recorded with a lag of three to 
four quarters).  
15 Alternative explanations have been given for this finding, referring in particular to inventory financing 
(Gertler and Gilchrist 1994) and banks’ portfolio behaviour (Den Haan et al. 2007). The results of our estimates 
did not change significantly when we replaced the individual bank loan rate with the Eonia, which also proved 
to have a positive and statistically significant coefficient, or the spread between the two rates.   17
period, this result is to be interpreted with caution, given that the analysis is based on a very 
small number of observations for the crisis period.  
All in all, the estimated relationships between the rate of growth of loans to enterprises 
and the BLS variables indicate that changes in supply conditions played an important role 
during the sample period and that this result is robust to the introduction of control variables. 
The relationship is apparently asymmetric (only “tightened” conditions enter significantly); 
however, this finding needs to be interpreted carefully, given that the banks have rarely 
reported an easing of credit standards. Demand factors, as captured by the BLS, also played 
a significant role, though the way they did is less clear when control variables are 
introduced.
16 
Results for mortgage loans to households 
For mortgage loans to households, considering specification (a) in Table 3, only the 
dummies capturing demand conditions are significant, with the expected sign and a higher 
coefficient than in the case of loans to enterprises; the estimated coefficients indicate that a 
weakening in demand conditions reported by all banks in the panel would be associated with 
a reduction in the (contemporaneous) q-o-q rate of growth of loans of about 2.0 and 1.0 
percentage points, respectively, for the “decreased considerably” and the “decreased 
somewhat” answers. BLS supply indicators are not shown to have played a significant role. 
Columns (b) and (c) show that the coefficients of the BLS demand indicator become 
smaller and lose statistical significance once we include control variables. It is also 
interesting to notice that, contrary to what we observed for the case of loans to enterprises, 
the individual bank loan interest rate enters with a negative sign, suggesting that a demand 
effect prevails in its relationship with credit developments. House prices and nominal GDP 
growth also enter significantly with the expected sign. No change in the relationship is 
observed when we consider the crisis period separately (columns d and e). 
                                                           
16 There are no substantial changes in the results if we collapse into just two dummies both the BLS 
indicator of supply conditions (“tightening” and “easing”) and the indicator of demand conditions (“increasing” 
and “decreasing”), i.e. if we disregard the difference between the “somewhat” and “considerably” modalities. 
The results are also similar if we use one variable for both supply and demand (each taking values from 1 to 5, 
corresponding to the banks’ answers to the BLS questions; i.e. implicitly assuming a linear relationship 
between loan growth and BLS answers).  18
Table 2. Estimated panel regressions for loans to enterprises 
(sample period: 2002Q4 – 2009Q4) 
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
BLS indicator of supply conditions
tightened considerably -2.30** -2.16*** -1.85 -2.66*** -2.38***
(-2.6) (-2.6) (-1.4) (-3.0) (-2.8)
tightened somewhat -1.72*** -1.57*** -2.01*** -1.58** -1.56**
(-3.6) (-3.1) (-3.3) (-2.3) (-2.3)
eased somewhat -0.53 -0.51 -0.55 -0.39 -0.49
(-0.3) (-0.2) (-0.3) (-0.2) (-0.2)
BLS indicator of demand conditions
decreased somewhat -0.85* -0.42 -0.10 -0.10 0.09
(-1.8) (-0.9) (-0.2) (-0.2) (0.2)
increased somewhat 1.39*** 1.10** 1.02* 1.39*** 1.09**
(2.6) (2.1) (1.8) (2.6) (2.1)
Control variables
Individual bank loan rate 0.67*** 0.75 0.65***
(4.0) (1.3) (3.6)
Nominal GDP growth rate 0.22 0.22
(0.8) (0.8)
Change in financing needs 0.81 1.45
(0.4) (0.6)
Additional effect during the crisis
BLS supply - tightened somewhat*Lehman -0.24 0.06
(-0.3) (0.1)
BLS demand - decreased somewhat*Lehman -1.47* -1.07
(-1.9) (-1.3)
Constant term 2.38*** -1.45 -1.86 2.38*** -2.22
(5.5) (-0.4) (-1.2) (5.4) (-0.6)
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Seasonal dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies no no yes no yes
Observations 196 196 196 196 196
Adjusted R-squared 0.268 0.308 0.329 0.268 0.303
 
Notes: the dependent variable is the quarter-on-quarter rate of growth of loans to non-financial corporations 
granted by each Italian bank participating in the BLS. BLS variables are based on individual replies by the 
same banks. All regressors are included with contemporaneous values except for supply indicators, which are 
included with a 1-period lag. t-statistics in brackets; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the level of 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 3. Estimated panel regressions for mortgage loans to households 
(sample period: 2002Q4 – 2009Q4) 
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
BLS indicator of supply conditions
tightened somewhat 0.29 0.22 0.22 0.85 0.45
(0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.9) (0.5)
eased somewhat 1.16 1.06 1.06 1.17 1.13
(1.2) (1.3) (1.3) (1.2) (1.4)
BLS indicator of demand conditions
decreased considerably -2.03** -1.31 0.31 -2.09* -2.20**
(-2.2) (-1.4) (0.4) (-1.8) (-2.3)
decreased somewhat -1.00* -0.18 -0.18 -1.10 -1.21*
(-1.8) (-0.3) (-0.4) (-1.6) (-1.7)
increased somewhat 0.16 -0.68 -0.57 0.13 -0.78*
(0.3) (-1.5) (-1.1) (0.3) (-1.7)
increased considerably 0.01 -1.36 -1.88 0.01 -1.52
(0.0) (-0.4) (-0.6) (0.0) (-0.5)
Control variables
Individual bank loan rate -0.50** -0.86 -0.50**
(-2.4) (-1.0) (-2.0)
Nominal GDP growth rate 0.69*** 0.88***
(2.8) (3.2)
House price growth rate 0.48*** 0.53***
(2.6) (2.6)
Additional effect during the crisis
BLS supply - tightened somewhat*crisis -1.42 -0.82
(-1.1) (-0.6)
BLS demand - decreased considerably*crisis 0.79 2.30
(0.5) (1.6)
BLS demand - decreased somewhat*crisis 0.51 2.41*
(0.5) (2.2)
Constant term 3.79*** 5.26*** 2.81 3.81*** 5.33***
(5.2) (3.9) (1.1) (5.2) (3.9)
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Seasonal dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies no no yes no no
Observations 207 200 200 200 200
Adjusted R-squared 0.044 0.115 0.253 0.034 0.115
 
Notes: the dependent variable is the quarter-on-quarter rate of growth of mortgage loans to 
households granted by each Italian bank participating in the BLS. BLS variables are based 
on individual replies by the same banks. All regressors are included with contemporaneous 
values. t-statistics in brackets; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the level of 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
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4.  “Pure supply” vs. “perception of risk” effects: evidence for loans to enterprises  
An important issue, in particular concerning credit developments during the financial 
crisis, is whether banks modified their credit standards because of changes in their own 
conditions (balance sheet constraints, ability to access market financing) or instead in 
reaction to the risks connected with economic developments and borrowers’ 
creditworthiness. This analysis has significant policy implications, since both the effects of 
the supply tightening on credit dynamics and the appropriate policy reactions can depend on 
the factors driving it. 
As described in Section 2, the BLS provides useful information to investigate this 
issue, as banks are asked not only the general question concerning changes in their credit 
standards, but also a further question concerning the importance of the various factors 
determining the changes in their supply policy, differentiating between: i) “cost of funds and 
balance sheet constraints” (with a further distinction between “costs related to bank’s capital 
position”, “banks’ ability to access market financing” and “bank’s liquidity position”); ii) 
“pressure from competition”; iii) “perception of risk” (in turn relating to “expectations 
regarding general economic activity”, “industry or firm-specific outlook”, or “risk on 
collateral demanded”). 
Although all factors will be considered in our empirical analysis, the first and third 
groups are the most relevant.
17 Factors belonging to the first group can unambiguously be 
interpreted as “pure” supply (or “credit crunch”) factors. The case is less clear for the third 
group. A more prudent attitude on the part of banks may in fact be the proper reaction to the 
increase in borrowers’ risk of default, in which case it cannot be characterized as a “credit 
crunch” factor. But it may also reflect a reduction in banks’ ability or willingness to assess 
borrowers’ creditworthiness properly, or an increase in banks’ risk aversion beyond what is 
warranted by economic developments, in which case it can indeed be considered a “credit 
crunch” factor.  
Bearing this distinction in mind, we run a regression of the q-o-q growth rate of loans 
to enterprises on the three categories of factors considered in the BLS. The factors related to 
“cost of funds and balance sheet constraints” are considered separately, while the 
information concerning “perception of risk” is collapsed into just one variable, 
independently of whether these perceptions refer to the expectations of general economic 
                                                           
17 Motivations related to pressure from competition are almost never reported during periods of tightening.  21
developments, the industry or firm-specific outlook, or the risk on collateral.
18 For this 
variable, we distinguish between the replies “contributed considerably to a tightening” and 
“contributed somewhat to a tightening”. This distinction was not necessary for the other 
factors, as they were never reported with the “considerably” qualification.
19 
The results, reported in Table 4, indicate that among factors relating to the banks’ 
balance sheet constraints, only costs related to their capital position affected loan growth 
significantly (with a lag of two quarters). The perception-of-risk variable appears to have 
played an important role mainly during the crisis (with a lag of 1 quarter) and more clearly 
so when it is reported to have “contributed considerably to the tightening”.  
These results can be considered as complementary with respect to the findings for the 
overall supply indicator. In this regard, it is to be noted that in the BLS there is not always a 
clear correspondence between the banks’ answers concerning the changes in their credit 
standards and replies concerning the factors behind these changes. In particular, there are 
cases in which a bank signals no change in its own overall supply policy but reports that a 
specific factor has contributed to a change. This suggests that the banks’ replies concerning 
the specific factors are not always “conditional” on their answers on their overall supply 
policy (although this is what the formulation of the questionnaire would imply). 
This issue is especially relevant for the analysis of the most recent part of the sample 
period. In the course of 2009 the number of banks reporting a further tightening began to 
decrease (as reflected in a marked reduction in the overall supply indicator), while at the 
same time around half of them continued to indicate that perception of risk considerations 
were still contributing to a restrictive supply policy until 2009q3. It is interesting to consider 
this apparently contradictory evidence in connection with two further observations.  
First, in 2009 the BLS results for the Italian banks are somewhat in contrast with those 
obtained from national business surveys (contrary to what had been observed in the previous 
part of the crisis, when there had been a high correlation; Figure 5). While the banks’ replies 
indicate that supply tightening continued at a progressively reduced pace and came to a halt 
                                                           
18 When considered separately, the three “perception of risk” factors tend to offset each other, because of a 
strong collinearity, with perception related to general economic developments dominating in most of the 
specifications.  
19 In order to decide the indicators to be included and the lag order for each of them, we run preliminary 
regressions for the q-o-q growth rate of loans on each of the factors separately (with lags ranging from zero to 
four quarters), always controlling for BLS demand conditions.  22
at the end of the year, firms kept on signalling significant further tightening until the end of 
the year (at an almost unchanged pace with respect to June 2009), as indicated both by the 
survey carried out by ISAE (Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses) and by that 
conducted by the Bank of Italy and the daily Il Sole 24 Ore.
20 
Table 4. Loans to enterprises and factors behind changes in credit standards 
(sample period: 2002Q4 – 2009Q4) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
   BLS factors behind changes in credit standards
   Costs related to bank's capital position
   contributed somewhat to tightening -2.15*** -1.83** -2.03*** -1.99*** -1.75*** -2.04***
   Bank's ability to access market financing
   contributed somewhat to tightening -0.82 -2.07 -2.23 -1.14 -2.28 -2.55
   Bank's liquidity position
   contributed somewhat to tightening -0.26 0.31 0.69 0.22 0.69 0.76
   Pressure from competition
   contributed somewhat to easing -0.43 -0.65 -1.20 -0.52 -0.88 -1.26
   Perception of risk
   contributed considerably to tightening -1.75* -1.22 -1.22 -0.55 -0.31 -0.45
   contributed somewhat to tightening -0.01 0.39 0.44 -0.01 0.61 0.55
 BLS indicator of demand conditions
 decreased somewhat -1.20** -0.88* -0.55 -0.92** -0.68 -0.46
 increased somewhat 1.39*** 1.15** 1.03* 1.40** 1.15** 1.03*
 Control variables
 Individual bank loan rate 0.68*** 0.68 0.55*** 0.66
 Nominal GDP 0.44 0.31
 Financing needs 2.05 5.22**
 Additional effect during the crisis
   Perception of risk
   contributed considerably to tightening * Lehman -3.34*** -3.19** -2.70**
   contributed somewhat to tightening * Lehman -1.29* -1.68* -1.30
Constant 2.31*** -3.47 -1.77 2.48*** 2.41*** -1.23
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies no no yes no no yes
Observations 185 185 185 185 185 185
Adjusted R-squared 0.267 0.308 0.345 0.284 0.273 0.349
 
Notes: the dependent variable is the q-o-q growth rate of loans to enterprises. BLS specific factors are based on 
individual replies by the same banks. All regressors for supply conditions are included with a lag of one quarter, except 
for “costs related to bank’s capital position” which is included with a lag of two quarters. “Perception of risk” is a 
dummy variable taking a value of 1 when banks indicate a change in credit standards stemming from at least one of the 
following factors: “expectations regarding general economic activity”, “industry or firm-specific outlook”, “risk on the 
collateral demanded”. All the regressions include seasonal dummies and bank-specific fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
                                                           
20  A similar contrast is observed between the results of the BLS for the euro area and those of the survey of 
firms carried out by the ECB in cooperation with the European Commission twice a year since mid-2009 (ECB 
Survey on access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises in the euro area).   23





















































































































Bank of Italy - Il Sole 24 Ore survey (left-hand scale)
ISAE survey (left-hand scale)
Euro area Bank Lending Survey - Italian banks (right-hand scale)  
Notes: for the BLS indicator, the net percentage of banks indicating a tightening in credit 
standards is reported; for business surveys, the net percentage of firms indicating a worsening 
in their access to credit is reported. 
Secondly, in the same period the estimated regressions including the overall indicator 
of supply conditions produce large negative residuals in some quarters (2009Q2 and 
2009Q4; Figure 6a), suggesting that part of the continuing sharp fall in loans to enterprises 
in this phase remains unexplained. Interestingly, replacing the overall supply indicator with 
the specific factors results in a significant reduction in the residuals (in particular in 
2009Q2). This suggests that in this period the banks’ answers on their perception of risk 
provided a more telling picture of the orientation of their policies than their answers on the 
overall tightening. It is to be noted, however, that a greater and more generalized 
improvement in the fit is obtained when we include the individual bank loan rate and 
macroeconomic indicators in the regression, corresponding to specification (e) in Table 4 
(Figure 6b).  
In the light of the evidence provided in this section, in Section 5 we use both the BLS 
overall indicator of supply conditions and the specific factor indicators, as well as 
specifications with and without control variables, to obtain more robust estimates of the 
importance of supply factors during the crisis.
21  
                                                           
21 As described in Section 2, in the BLS banks also provide responses about specific terms and conditions 
for approving loans, specifying whether changes in supply conditions took place through the size of loans or 
credit lines or through pricing. We investigated the information content of these answers by replacing in our 
regressions the overall supply indicator with the specific indicators for the various terms and conditions. The 
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Figure 6. Estimated residuals  
(percentage points) 
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5.  The slowdown of credit during the financial crisis: supply tightening or lack in 
demand? 
In order to assess the role played by supply and demand factors in the sharp slowdown 
of credit during the financial crisis, we performed a counterfactual exercise in which we 
compared the fitted values obtained from our estimates with those we would obtain had 
supply and demand conditions, as captured by the BLS, remained unchanged with respect to 
the pre-crisis period. This was done by using the estimated coefficients and setting the BLS 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
results (not reported but available from the authors upon request) indicate that only changes in the size of loans 
or credit lines played a significant role, though only in the regressions without control variables. The fit of the 
equation worsens with respect to the alternative specifications (i.e. including the overall indicator of supply 
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variables equal to their values in the second quarter of 2007, before the beginning of the 
financial crisis.
22 
We carried out this analysis considering both the indicator of overall supply conditions 
and the indicators of the specific factors behind them. The former is the main piece of 
information provided by this type of survey and the one we can expect banks to pay the 
greatest attention to when formulating their answers. It is also the one used in most of the 
existing empirical literature based on bank lending surveys. As discussed in Section 4, the 
latter piece of information allows us to disentangle the supply effects attributable to cost of 
funds and balance sheet conditions from those related to perception of risk. In addition, it 
offers useful complementary evidence in particular in cases in which the signals it provides 
do not coincide exactly with those of the overall indicator, possibly reducing the unexplained 
part of credit dynamics.  
The results are reported in Figure 7a for the specification based on the overall supply 
indicator and in Figure 7b for the specification based on the specific factor indicators. In 
both cases the estimated regressions includes only BLS indicators (i.e. with no control 
variables; specification (a) in Table 2 and (d) in Table 4).  
Figure 7a shows that the negative contribution of the supply factors to the q-o-q rate of 
growth of loans ranged between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points until the third quarter of 2008; 
it rose sharply in the following quarters, especially after the Lehman collapse, reaching a 
maximum of 1.7 (about 7 percentage points on an annual basis) in the first quarter of 2009, 
when credit developments reflected (with a one-quarter lag) the maximum tightening 
recorded by the BLS supply indicator in the last quarter of 2008. In the following quarters 
the contribution remained negative, but decreased in absolute value, returning to pre-Lehman 
levels in 2009Q3 and to 0.2 percentage points (0.8 points in annualized terms) in 2009Q4. 
The negative contribution of demand factors was significant over the entire crisis period; it 
became larger following the Lehman collapse and remained sizeable for most of 2009, 
reaching a maximum in the second quarter (1.1 percentage points, or more than 4 points in 
annualized terms). On average, over the entire crisis period (2007Q3-2009Q4), the negative 
contributions of supply and demand factors to the annualized q-o-q rate of growth of loans to 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
conditions or the specific indicators for the factors determining them), suggesting that this part of the survey 
does not provide especially valuable information. 
22 As a robustness check, the same exercise was carried out setting the BLS indicators at, alternatively, their 
“unchanged conditions” level or their pre-crisis average level (i.e. the average over the period 2002Q4-
2007Q2).  26
enterprises granted by the banks in the panel, as captured by the BLS indicators, amounted to 
2.7 and 2.6 percentage points respectively. 
 
Figure 7. Contributions of supply and demand factors to the q-o-q rate of growth of loans to 
enterprises estimated for the panel of Italian banks participating in the BLS 
(percentage points) 
 
a) regression that includes the overall BLS indicator of supply conditions 
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Notes: this figure reports the results from the estimated regressions that include only BLS variables; 
results for the regressions that also include control variables are reported in the text.  27
Figure 7b indicates that supply factors related to risk perception played a major role, 
while factors related to the balance sheet position had a minor but non negligible impact, 
especially in the most acute phase of the crisis; on average, over the period considered, their 
effect was about one fourth of the entire effect attributable to supply factors.
23 The 
comparison with Figure 7a suggests that the contribution of supply factors to loan 
developments as captured by the two types of indicator is very similar during the most 
severe phase of the crisis. By contrast, differences emerge for the initial part of the period, 
when the tightening is only signalled by the overall indicator (except for 2008Q1), and for 
the last part (since 2009Q2), when the factor indicators – in particular related to perception 
of risk – signal a more persistent restriction than suggested by the overall indicator. On 
average, over the crisis period, the contribution of supply conditions resulting from this 
estimate is somewhat smaller than the one based on the overall indicator (2.3 per cent in 
annualized terms) 
In order to test the robustness of our findings we carried out the same counterfactual 
exercise with alternative specifications including control variables (individual bank loan rate 
plus, alternatively, macroeconomic variables or time dummies, corresponding to 
specifications (b) and (c) in Table 2 and specifications (d) and (e) in Table 4). With respect 
to the regression that only includes the BLS indicators, these specifications generate a better 
fit at the expense of a less immediate interpretation, since it is impossible to determine 
whether the part of credit developments explained by the control variables should be 
attributed to supply or to demand effects. 
As shown in Table 5, the results are similar across specifications. Considering all of 
them, the contribution of supply factors to the q-o-q rate of growth of loans to enterprises in 
the period 2007Q2-2009Q4 can be estimated to be negative by between 2.2 and 3.1 
percentage points. 
 
Table 5. Contribution of supply factors to the q-o-q rate of growth of loans to enterprises  
(percentage points; average contribution over the period 2007Q2-2009Q4 in annualized terms) 
BLS indicators and 
micro/macro controls
-2.8
BLS indicators, micro 
controls and time 
dummies
-2.2
Based on the BLS overall indicator of supply conditions Based on factors behind changes in the BLS overall supply conditions
Only BLS indicators
-2.7




BLS indicators, micro 




                                                           
23 These results are consistent with those of Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010). Using individual data for both 
banks and firms, they find a significant role for supply factors in the credit slowdown in Italy in the two 
quarters immediately following the Lehman collapse. They also provide specific evidence indicating that the 
impact of capital constraints and liquidity shortage on the rate of growth in loans to firms in these quarters 
amounted to about 1 percentage point in annualized terms.  28
It should be noted that these estimates are for the panel of banks participating in the 
BLS, which are mainly large banks. Since the slowdown in lending to enterprises was 
sharper for them than for smaller banks, the question is whether this reflects some difference 
in the relative importance of supply factors. Evidence from the Regional Bank Lending 
Survey for Italy
24 suggests that this is not the case: on average, between the fourth quarter of 
2008 and the end of 2009 the indicators of supply conditions for the medium-to-large banks 
and for small banks do not differ significantly (while a more marked worsening of demand 
conditions was reported by the former). On this evidence, we conclude that the estimates of 
the supply effects we have obtained for the BLS panel do substantially hold for the entire 
Italian banking system. 
6. Robustness: empirical analysis using the cumulated BLS indicators 
In this section we consider the possibility that the relationship between loan growth 
and BLS information may be better captured using a different empirical specification from 
the one used in Section 3. 
Consider, for instance, the case in which the BLS supply indicator signals a tightening. 
The coefficients estimated with the regressions carried out in Section 3 indicate how, on 
average (i.e. over the sample period and for the whole panel of banks participating in the 
survey), the q-o-q growth in loans is affected by a tightening in the same quarter or in a 
previous one, compared with the growth rate that would have been observed had the BLS 
indicator signalled unchanged supply conditions. These results, however, do not tell us 
whether this effect varies depending on whether this is a first tightening or a further 
tightening following one or more quarters of restriction. In other words, it does not tell us 
whether what matters is only what the banks report concerning the change in their credit 
standards in the quarter considered or also what they had reported in the previous quarters. In 
the latter case, a stronger relationship should hold between the rate of growth in loans and 
the BLS supply indicator when the cumulated level of the latter is included in the regression.  
Although this issue is very important for interpretation of the information provided by 
this type of survey, it has received little attention in the literature. The study by Schreft and 
                                                           
24 This survey is carried out by the Bank of Italy regional branches on a panel of more than 400 banks, 
which include both medium-to-large and small banks. It was conducted for the first time at the beginning of 
2009, referring to credit conditions in the fourth quarter of 2008; since mid-2009, it is carried biannually. It 
provides information with a breakdown by region, economic sector, firm size, and, most relevant to our 
purposes, bank size.  29
Owens (1991) is, to our knowledge, the only one that considers it explicitly, though without 
carrying out any specific empirical analysis. The authors notice that from 1967 to 1983 
respondents in the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey almost never 
reported a net easing of standards on business loans. Based on the observation that the banks 
“report the change in lending standards over a three-month period, not how tight standards 
are at the survey data”, they remark that “because the results show banks continuously 
tightening their standards from 1967 through 1983, if we take the survey results literally, 
lending standards would have been unbelievably stringent by late 1983” (p. 10). Apparently, 
they do not consider the possibility that banks provide answers that are inconsistent with the 
formulation of the question they are asked. Rather, they argue that this evidence “suggests 
that the survey responses might be biased” and that the bias might stem “from the incentive 
that regulated institutions have to report to their regulators a tightening of standards, 
especially when their reports are not made anonymously”. 
Interestingly, this issue also applies to the BLS results. As in the Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey, in the BLS banks are asked to indicate how credit standards on their loans 
have changed over the last three months, not how tight standards are at the time of the 
survey. Moreover, the results indicate a clear predominance of tightening: for the euro area 
as a whole, only in 9 quarters out of a total of 29 since the survey was begun has the net 
percentage indicator signalled an easing of supply conditions, compared to 19 quarters in 
which it signalled a tightening; for the panel of Italian banks, this holds only in 3 quarters, 
against 20. This issue is especially important for the interpretation of supply conditions 
during the financial crisis, which we focus on. For both the euro area and Italy, in fact, we 
observe a series of consecutive restrictions beginning in 2007Q3, which reach the maximum 
intensity in the last quarter of 2008 but continue, although at a slower pace, in the following 
quarters too. Thus, according to a literal reading of the banks’ answers, the degree of 
tightening at the end of 2009 would be significantly higher than it was at the peak of the 
financial crisis. 
The interpretation of the answers on demand conditions is even more problematic: the 
banks are requested to indicate how the demand for loans has changed, apart from normal 
seasonal fluctuations, over the past three months. Given that the possible answers are 
expressed in terms of “increase” or “decrease”, one would expect that an indicator in the 
“decreasing” territory is associated, ceteris paribus, to a contraction (i.e. a negative rate of 
growth) in credit, while an indicator in the “increasing” territory should be associated with a 
positive growth rate. However, even a simple descriptive examination of the relationship  30
between the BLS demand indicator and loans developments suggests that a literal reading of 
the banks’ answers is problematic (quite often a negative BLS demand indicator is 
associated with a largely positive change in loans). This suggests that the banks’ assessments 
on demand should be interpreted in terms of “acceleration” and “deceleration”, rather than 
“increase” and “decrease”. The analysis presented in this paper, based on the growth rate of 
loans as the dependent variable, is consistent with this interpretation.  
Accordingly, we analyse how the relationship between developments in loans to 
enterprises and the BLS information is affected when we consider the cumulated level of the 
supply and demand indicators rather than the indicators themselves.
25 
To do this, we replace the dummies used in Section 3 with alternative dummies that 
capture the length of the phases of tightening/easing of credit standards, along with the 
phases of increase/decrease in demand conditions. For instance, the dummy for the 
“tightened somewhat” supply condition is replaced by the following four dummies 
(dummies for other supply conditions and for demand conditions are constructed similarly):  
BLS_S_tightsome_1 = 1 in the first quarter in which the “tightened somewhat” reply 
is recorded 
BLS_S_tightsome_2 = 1 when a “tightened somewhat” reply is recorded for the 
second consecutive quarter  
BLS_S_tightsome_3 = 1 when a “tightened somewhat” change is recorded for the 
third consecutive quarter  
BLS_S_tightsome_4 = 1 when a “tightened somewhat” change is recorded for more 
than 3 consecutive quarters  
The results, reported in Table 6, do not provide evidence of a clear relationship 
between the persistence of changes in supply and demand conditions and the estimated 
impact on the rate of growth in loans. The fact that the supply “tightened somewhat” 
condition affects credit growth significantly only when it is observed for more than two 
quarters could be seen as consistent with such a relationship, but the decrease in the 
coefficient after more than three quarters points in the opposite direction. Moreover, a set of 
F-test rejects the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients differ depending on the 
persistence of the tightening.
26 
 
                                                           
25 Results for mortgage loans to households are available from the authors upon request. 
26 Results for the “tightened considerably” dummies also do not provide clear evidence and should in any 
case be interpreted with caution, given that each of the three dummies considered takes the value of 1 only in 
one quarter.  31
Table 6. Estimated regressions for loans to enterprises with BLS cumulated indicators 
(sample period: 2002Q4 – 2009Q4) 
Variables (a) (b) (c)
BLS indicator of supply conditions (in brackets:
number of consecutive tightening/easing quarters)
tightened considerably (1 quarter) -3.01*** -2.48*** -2.26*
tightened considerably (2 quarters) -0.74 -0.81 0.87
tightened considerably (3 quarters) -4.97*** -5.01*** -5.61***
tightened somewhat (1 quarter) -1.41 -1.66* -1.84**
tightened somewhat (2 quarters) -1.03 -0.80 -1.69*
tightened somewhat (3 quarters) -2.72*** -2.50*** -2.92***
tightened somewhat (more than 3 quarters) -2.32*** -1.76*** -1.88**
eased somewhat (1 quarter) -0.55 -0.45 -0.59
BLS indicator of demand conditions (in brackets:
number of consecutive decrease/increase quarters)
decreased somewhat (1 quarter) -0.96* -0.63 -0.37
decreased somewhat (2 quarters) 0.72 1.26* 1.29
decreased somewhat (3 quarters) -2.52 -1.97 -0.97
decreased somewhat (more than 3 quarters) -1.42 -0.36 -0.23
increased somewhat (1 quarter) 1.43* 1.32* 0.98
increased somewhat (2 quarters) 1.56** 1.08 1.41*
increased somewhat (3 quarters) 1.20 0.75 0.70
increased somewhat (more than 3 quarters) 1.27 0.72 0.57
Control variables
Individual bank loan rate 0.71*** 0.80
Nominal GDP growth rate 0.20
Change in financing needs 0.69
Constant term 2.49*** -1.34 -1.83
Fixed effects yes yes yes
Seasonal dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies no no yes
Observations 196 196 196
Adjusted R-squared 0.250 0.293 0.306
 
Notes: the dependent variable is the quarter-on-quarter rate of growth of loans to enterprises granted 
by each Italian bank participating in the BLS. BLS variables are based on individual replies by the 
same banks. All regressors are included with contemporaneous values except for supply indicators, 
which are included with a 1-period lag. t-statistics in brackets; *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
 
The results obtained above could be affected by degree-of-freedom problems, given 
the large number of parameters compared with the number of observations. Therefore we 
also addressed the same question in a more parsimonious framework, by collapsing the 
information into just one variable for the supply conditions and one variable for the demand  32
conditions, for both the BLS indicators and the corresponding cumulated indicators, 
implicitly assuming that a linear relationship holds between the various possible answers to 
each question. For instance, in the case of the supply indicator, the variable BLS_S takes a 
value of 1 to 5, corresponding to answers ranging from “eased considerably” to “tightened 
considerably”, while the cumulated indicator is defined as follows: 
(4)    
2002q4  t if                             _ _ _













it S BLS cum S BLS
S BLS
cum S BLS  
The corresponding variables for the demand conditions are defined similarly. 
The results are reported in Table 7. For the regression with the cumulated indicators 
the estimated coefficients for both the supply and the demand BLS indicators tend to loose 
statistical significance when the control variables are included; the fit of the equation is 
worse, compared to the regression with the BLS indices, for all the specifications considered. 
Table 7. Comparison between estimated regressions based on BLS indicators and BLS cumulated 
indicators under the hypothesis of linearity among BLS response categories  
(sample period: 2002Q4 – 2009Q4) 
(a) (b) (c) (a') (b') (c')
BLS supply conditions -1.42*** -1.26*** -1.42*** -0.24*** -0.23** -0.15
BLS demand conditions 1.17*** 0.83*** 0.66* 0.29*** 0.07 0.19
Control variables
Individual bank loan rate 0.67*** 0.85 0.69*** 0.82
Nominal GDP growth rate 0.28 0.68**
Change in financing needs 0.78 5.50
Constant term -5.32*** -7.58** -8.29** 4.09*** -6.74 -0.64
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Seasonal dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies no no yes no no yes
Observations 196 196 196 196 196 196
Adjusted R-squared 0.270 0.310 0.324 0.194 0.258 0.279
With BLS indices With BLS cumulated indices
 
Notes: the dependent variable is the quarter-on-quarter rate of growth of loans granted by each Italian 
bank participating in the BLS. BLS variables are based on individual replies by the same banks. All 
regressors are included with contemporaneous values except for the BLS supply indicator, which is 
included with a lag of one quarter. t-statistics in brackets; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
All in all, these results indicate that there is a clear case for including the BLS 
indicators rather than their cumulated levels in the regression for loans to enterprises, though 
this implies that the interpretation of this information needs to be qualified with respect to a 
literal reading of the survey questions and answers.
 Indeed, our results suggest that banks’  33
responses may largely reflect their assessment of the distance between the degree of 
tightness of their own credit standards in the reference quarter and some “benchmark” 
condition they are likely to have in mind rather than their assessment of the actual change in 
the degree of tightness over the three months considered in each run of the survey. 
7. Conclusions  
In this paper we use the qualitative indicators of supply and demand conditions derived 
from the Italian part of the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey to estimate the relationship 
between these factors and credit developments in Italy and to provide an assessment of the 
relative importance of supply and demand factors in the sharp fall in credit growth during the 
financial crisis. The dataset combines the qualitative information contained in the BLS with 
micro-data on quantities and prices of loans granted by the panel of Italian banks 
participating in the survey, as well as on other individual bank variables. The sample period 
goes from 2002Q4, the first quarter for which the BLS is available, to 2009Q4. 
Part of the study considers both loans to enterprises and loans to households for house 
purchases, while a more in-depth investigation of the role of changes in credit standards and 
the factors behind them is only carried out for loans to enterprises, which we deem to be 
more important in the light of their sharp deceleration during the financial crisis (much 
stronger than the one observed for loans to households) and their stronger estimated 
relationship with the BLS indicators. In fact, BLS indicators for both supply and demand 
conditions prove to have a statistically significant role in explaining changes in lending to 
enterprises in Italy, and it appears to be robust to the introduction of various control 
variables. The relationship with the supply indicator appears to be asymmetric, as it is 
significant only when the indicators signal a tightening. However, this result needs to be 
interpreted with caution, given the very small number of responses indicating an easing of 
credit standards. As to the relative importance of the factors determining the changes in 
credit standards, costs related to the capital position and banks’ risk perception (either in 
connection with expectations regarding general economic activity or industry or firm-
specific outlook) appear to have played a major role. The latter were especially important 
during the crisis period.   
A counterfactual exercise shows that both demand and supply factors had a significant 
negative impact on credit developments during the financial crisis, with supply effects 
peaking in 2008Q4 and 2009Q1. On average, over the period 2007Q3-2009Q4 the negative  34
contribution of supply factors to the annualized quarter-on-quarter rate of growth in loans to 
enterprises by the banks in the BLS panel is estimated to be between 2.2 to 3.1 percentage 
points, depending on the specification. About one fourth of this effect can be attributed to 
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Appendix. Additional descriptive statistics 
Table A1 - Factors behind changes in credit standards for loans to enterprises  
(frequency of responses as a percentage of the total) 
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.0 92.4 7.6 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 0.0 90.8 9.2 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 0.0 91.8 8.2 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.8 99.2 0.0 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 0.0 93.4 6.6 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 0.5 97.1 2.4 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.8 98.5 0.8 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 0.0 90.8 9.2 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 0.5 95.7 3.9 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 19.9 80.2 0.0 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 2.6 97.4 0.0 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 13.5 86.5 0.0 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 2.3 97.7 0.0 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 1.5 98.6 0.0 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.8 98.5 0.8 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 0.5 99.0 0.5 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 1.5 60.3 37.4 0.8 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 1.3 52.6 39.5 6.6 100
Whole period 0.0 1.5 57.5 38.2 2.9 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.8 47.3 45.8 6.1 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 1.3 43.4 48.7 6.6 100
Whole period 0.0 1.0 45.9 46.9 6.3 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.0 82.4 17.6 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 0.0 77.6 22.4 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 0.0 80.7 19.3 0.0 100
Expectations regarding general economic activity
Industry or firm-specific outlook
Risk on the collateral demanded
A) Cost of funds and balance sheet constraints
B) Pressure from competition
Competition from other banks
C) Perception of risk
  Competition from non-banks
  Competition from market financing
Cost related to bank's capital position
   Bank's ability to access market financing


























Table A2 - Conditions and terms for approving loans or credit lines to enterprises 
(frequency of responses as a percentage of the total) 
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 13.0 66.4 20.6 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 2.6 51.3 46.1 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 9.2 60.9 30.0 0.0 100
\
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.0 43.5 52.7 3.8 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 0.0 31.6 63.2 5.3 100
Whole period 0.0 0.0 39.1 56.5 4.4 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.0 83.2 16.8 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 0.0 88.2 11.8 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 0.0 85.0 15.0 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.0 85.5 14.5 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 2.6 67.1 30.3 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 1.0 78.7 20.3 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.8 85.5 13.7 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 0.0 85.5 14.5 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 0.5 85.5 14.0 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.8 85.5 13.7 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 0.0 88.2 11.8 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 0.5 86.5 13.0 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 3.1 82.4 14.5 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 2.6 80.3 17.1 0.0 100














Margin on average loan
   Margin on riskier loans
Loan covenants
Maturity
B) Other conditions and terms
Non-interest rate charges











Table A3 - Factors behind the change in loan demand by enterprises 
(frequency of responses as a percentage of the total) 
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 1.5 18.3 59.5 19.9 0.8 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 2.6 35.5 54.0 7.9 0.0 100
Whole period 1.9 24.6 57.5 15.5 0.5 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 18.3 58.0 22.9 0.8 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 14.5 68.4 14.5 2.6 100
Whole period 0.0 16.9 61.8 19.8 1.5 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 9.2 71.8 19.1 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 1.3 29.0 60.5 9.2 0.0 100
Whole period 0.5 16.4 67.6 15.5 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 1.5 59.5 38.2 0.8 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 1.3 54.0 40.8 4.0 100
Whole period 0.0 1.5 57.5 39.1 1.9 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 6.1 81.7 12.2 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 2.6 88.2 9.2 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 4.8 84.1 11.1 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 17.6 82.4 0.0 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 4.0 90.8 5.3 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 12.6 85.5 1.9 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 3.8 96.2 0.0 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 1.3 98.7 0.0 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 2.9 97.1 0.0 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 9.2 80.2 10.7 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 2.6 93.4 4.0 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 6.8 85.0 8.2 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 6.1 82.4 11.5 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 1.3 97.4 1.3 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 4.4 87.9 7.7 0.0 100
A) Financing needs




















Issuance of debt securities
Issuance of equities
Loans from other banks
  Loans from non-banks
Fixed investment
   Inventories and working capital
Debt restructuring











Table A4 - Factors behind changes in credit standards for mortgage loans to households  
(frequency of responses as a percentage of the total) 
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.8 98.5 0.8 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 1.3 85.5 13.2 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 1.0 93.7 5.3 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 11.5 88.6 0.0 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 10.5 89.5 0.0 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 11.1 88.9 0.0 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 3.1 96.9 0.0 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 4.0 96.0 0.0 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 3.4 96.6 0.0 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 1.5 90.1 8.4 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 1.3 63.2 32.9 2.6 100
Whole period 0.0 1.5 80.2 17.4 1.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 4.6 92.4 3.1 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 1.3 67.1 29.0 2.6 100
Whole period 0.0 3.4 83.1 12.6 1.0 100
Expectations regarding general economic activity
Housing market prospects
A) Cost of funds and balance sheet constraints
B) Pressure from competition
Competition from other banks
C) Perception of risk





























Table A5 - Conditions and terms for approving mortgage loans to households  
(frequency of responses as a percentage of the total) 
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.8 98.5 0.8 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 1.3 85.5 13.2 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 1.0 93.7 5.3 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 11.5 88.6 0.0 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 10.5 89.5 0.0 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 11.1 88.9 0.0 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 3.1 96.9 0.0 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 4.0 96.0 0.0 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 3.4 96.6 0.0 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 1.5 90.1 8.4 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 1.3 63.2 32.9 2.6 100
Whole period 0.0 1.5 80.2 17.4 1.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 4.6 92.4 3.1 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 1.3 67.1 29.0 2.6 100
Whole period 0.0 3.4 83.1 12.6 1.0 100
Expectations regarding general economic activity
Housing market prospects
A) Cost of funds and balance sheet constraints
B) Pressure from competition
Competition from other banks
C) Perception of risk


































Table A6 - Factors behind the change in mortgage loan demand by households 
 (frequency of responses as a percentage of the total) 
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 7.6 66.4 24.4 1.5 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 4.0 36.8 54.0 5.3 0.0 100
Whole period 1.5 18.4 61.8 17.4 1.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 6.1 83.2 10.7 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 4.0 32.9 59.2 4.0 0.0 100
Whole period 1.5 15.9 74.4 8.2 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 6.9 88.6 3.8 0.8 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 17.1 77.6 5.3 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 10.6 84.5 4.4 0.5 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.8 77.1 22.1 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 9.2 80.3 10.5 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 3.9 78.3 17.9 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 1.5 94.7 3.8 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 0.0 96.0 4.0 0.0 100
Whole period 0.0 1.0 95.2 3.9 0.0 100
Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 0.0 95.3 4.7 0.0 100
During crisis (07q3-09q4) 0.0 0.0 97.4 2.6 0.0 100



















Loans from other banks
Other sources of finance
Housing market prospects
Consumer confidence
Non-housing related consumption expenditure
A) Financing needs
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